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THE CASE FOR KURDISH STATEHOOD IN IRAQ
Philip S. Hadji*
This Note argues the legal and political case for a Kurdish state in
Iraq. After some background on the Kurds, the Note begins by outlining the
elements of self-determination and concludes that the Iraqi Kurds possess
the right of self-determination. Next, the Note argues the Iraqi Kurds could
secede from Iraq in a manner that gains international support and causes
minimal disruption to the region through a process of “earned sovereignty.” Finally, the Note argues that American support of a Kurdish state in
Iraq would benefit the United States. The newly formed state would be a
secular democracy positioned in a strategically significant part of the
world, could be a strong American ally, and would reaffirm the United
States’ commitment to human rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the calamity in Iraq since the United States invasion in
2003, there is hope in the Kurdish region of Northern Iraq. Compared to the
rest of the country, violence in the Kurdish region has been relatively minor.1 In many other parts of the country, by contrast, different ethnic groups
living in close proximity to one another have engaged in high levels of sectarian violence.2 At times, this violance was best described as civil war.3
The relative stability in the Kurdistan region has allowed the Iraqi
Kurds to enjoy the country’s highest living standard and highest level of
foreign investment.4 Moreover, the region is stable enough to allow the Iraqi
Kurds to engage in foreign relations with other countries and even host
travelers and businessman from Europe.5 While the level of day-to-day violence in Iraq has largely subsided since the invasion U.S. invasion,
progress has come at a considerable price. Over four thousand American
troops have died,6 and the total economic cost to the U.S. may easily reach

1

In its report to Congress in March 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense noted the
Kurdish region remains “the least violent region of Iraq.” U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE,
MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ, REPORT TO CONGRESS 29 (Mar. 7, 2008). The
Economist colorfully characterized the Kurdish region as “a haven of peace in a sea of turmoil.” Does Independence Beckon?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 2007, at 47.
2
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, PUBL’N
NO. GAO-07-1197, SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ: IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS
NOT MET MOST LEGISLATIVE, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC BENCHMARKS 50–54 (2007).
3
See James D. Fearon, Iraq’s Civil War, 86 FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2007, at 2–15;
Nicholas Sambanis, Op-Ed., It’s Official: There Is Now a Civil War in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jul.
23, 2006, at D13 (defining civil wars as “armed conflicts between the government of a sovereign state and domestic political groups mounting effective resistance in relatively continuous fighting that causes high number of deaths”).
4
Michael Rubin, American Enterprise Inst., Is Iraqi Kurdistan a Good Ally?, MIDDLE
EASTERN OUTLOOK, Jan. 8, 2008, at 1, available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080107_22
566MEO01Rubin_g.pdf .
5
Id.
6
Sam Dagher, Helicopter Crash in Iraq Kills 4 Americans, in Biggest Toll Among G.I.’s
Since September, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at A14.
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over two trillion dollars.7 More than two million Iraqis—almost ten percent
of the prewar population—have fled to neighboring countries.8
The stability and autonomy that the Iraqi Kurds have enjoyed since
the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 has presented the Iraqi Kurds with a
tremendous opportunity. The Kurds have long dreamed of having their own
sovereign state, and have suffered greatly as a result of not having their own
state. Most notably, they were the victims of a genocide inflicted by Saddam Hussein, which took the lives of as many as 182,000 civilians.9 Given
this unfortunate history, and their position as the largest ethnic group in the
world without a country, the Iraqi Kurds have quite a compelling case for
statehood.
This Note argues the legal and political case for a Kurdish state in
Iraq. The first section provides background on the Kurds and Iraq. The
second section outlines the elements of self-determination and considers
whether the Iraqi Kurds possess the right of self-determination. The principle of self-determination is that distinct groups of people have the legal
right to determine for themselves to what state they wish to belong.10 Given
their common background, history, language, and culture, the Note concludes that the Iraqi Kurds qualify as a distinct group of people and therefore possess the legal right of self-determination.11
The third section addresses whether the Iraqi Kurds could secede
from Iraq in a manner that gains international support and causes minimal
disruption to the region. The secession of Kosovo—through the process of
“earned sovereignty”—demonstrates how a country can gradually secede
from its parent state with minimal disruption. This Note argues that based
on its success in Montenegro, Northern Ireland, and Kosovo—and the similarity between the religious and ethnic conflicts in these countries and
Iraq—the “earned sovereignty” approach could be followed in the Kurdish
region of Iraq to successfully execute a secession with broad support and
minimal disruption.12
Finally, the Note examines the interests of the United States in the
region. Ultimately, the legality of a Kurdish secession from Iraq will be
judged by whether states choose to recognize the new country.13 Given that
7

Jamie Wilson, Iraq War Could Cost U.S. Over $2 Trillion, Says Nobel Prize-Winning
Economist, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 7, 2006, at 16.
8
Sudarsan Raghavan, War in Iraq Propelling A Massive Migration, WASH. POST, Feb. 4,
2007, at A18.
9
Human Rights Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds, July
1993, http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFALPRE.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
10
See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
11
See infra Part II.A–D.
12
See infra Part III.C–D.
13
See infra Part III.E.
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the United States has invested tremendous resources in the Iraq war and is a
highly influential country, the support of the United States would greatly
help the Iraqi Kurds. Supporting Kurdish statehood would be in the best
interest of the United States.14 A Kurdish state would allow the United
States to exit Iraq on a positive note by helping form a self-supporting, secular democracy. Moreover, the newly formed state would be positioned in
a strategically significant part of the world and could be a strong American
ally.
I. BACKGROUND
Despite their long history in the Middle East, the Kurds still do not
have their own state. With a population of thirty-five million people, they
are the largest ethnic group in the world without a state.15 The Zakrus
Mountains, which separate Iran from Iraq, are considered to be their historical homeland.16 Today, most Kurds live in what are now the countries of
Turkey, Iran, and Iraq.17
A Kurdish state has long been the dream of Kurds. The dream came
close to reality after World War I, when the Kurds were promised a state in
the Treaty of Sèvres.18 Article 62 of the Treaty of Sèvres called for “a
scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas.”19 The
Treaty also specified that the Kurds had the right to petition the League of
Nations for independence.20 Turkey, however, did not accept the Treaty, and
it was never ratified. Instead, it was replaced with the Treaty of Lausanne,
which made no mention of Kurdish statehood.21

14

See infra Part IV.
Special Verdict, Case No 1/ CSecond/2006, Al Anfal, Iraq High Tribunal, Second Criminal Court, at 38 (2007), available at http://law.case.edu/grotian-momentblog/anfal/opinion.asp [hereinafter Anfal Case].
16
In the Cimmerian language, “Kurds” means “residents of the mountains,” which is
appropriate considering the terrain of the region. Id.
17
See infra Figure One; SUSAN D. MOELLER, COMPASSION FATIGUE 38 (1999).
18
See Brendan O’Leary & Kahled Salih, The Denial, Resurrection, and Affirmation of
Kurdistan, in THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ 3, 4 (Brendan O’Leary et al. eds., 2005).
19
Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey art. 62, Aug. 10,
1920 (never ratified, superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne), reprinted in 15 AM. J. INT’L L.
179 [hereinafter Treaty of Sèvres].
20
Id. art. 64.
21
O’Leary & Salih, supra note 18, at 4.
15
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Figure One: Map of Kurdish-Inhabited Areas22

Prior to the British invasion during World War I, the area that is
now known as the modern state of “Iraq” was under Ottoman rule.23 The
area was made up of three provinces around the towns of Basra, Baghdad,
and Mosul, occupied mostly by Shiite Arabs, Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds,
respectively.24 At the conclusion of World War I, the borders of the Middle
East were drawn by the European allies at the Conference at San Remo in
April 1920.25 The allies made borders that were essentially straight lines
drawn on a map of the Middle East that did not consider the traditional
boundaries of the region.26 The borders divided some tribes and placed rival
tribes together. The British were given control of Basra, Baghdad, and Mo22
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency Map, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at The
University of Texas at Austin (1992), http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_
asia/kurdish_lands_92.jpg (last visited Mar. 12, 2008).
23
WILLIAM R. POLK, UNDERSTANDING IRAQ 67 (Harper Perennial 2006).
24
CHARLES TRIPP, A HISTORY OF IRAQ 8 (3d ed. 2007).
25
COURTNEY HUNT, THE HISTORY OF IRAQ 61 (2005).
26
Id.
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sul, and decided to combine the three provinces into one territory that would
later become the state of Iraq.27 By deciding to combine the three provinces,
the British ignored the clear territorial and ethnic distinctions in the name of
preserving what was historically called “Mesopotamia.”28 Most strikingly,
“the British had no empathy or understanding of the cultural impact of
combining the Shiite and Sunni segments of the [territory into one] country.”29 These arbitrary borders split the Kurds into three countries—Iran,
Iraq, and Turkey—and left them without a state.30
The Iraqi Kurds have suffered greatly as a result of their not having
an independent state. Under the regime of Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi Kurds
have been the victims of crimes against humanity and genocide. Most notably, in the late 1980s the Iraqi armed forces launched what is known as the
Anfal campaign. During the Anfal campaign, “Iraqi armed forces . . . systematically destroyed more than four thousand Kurdish villages and several
small cities.”31 In 1987 and 1988 the Iraqi armed forces unleashed chemical
weapons and organized the deportation and execution of Kurdish civilians.32
As many as 182,000 Kurdish civilians were killed, making the Anfal campaign one of the deadliest atrocities in the last thirty years.33 With the help
of the international community, the Iraqi High Tribunal convicted the Anfal
campaign’s leaders of genocide, the most severe crime in the world.34
A de facto Kurdish state emerged in Northern Iraq following the
Gulf War in 1991.35 Ironically, an American decision during the Gulf War
intended to prevent any Kurdish state gave the Kurds the relative independence that they now enjoy. In the midst of an air campaign in February
1991, George H. W. Bush called on the Iraqi military and people to overthrow Saddam Hussein. However, Bush declined to move troops into Bagh27

POLK, supra note 23, at 82.
INTER-ALLIED COMM’N ON MANDATES IN TURKEY, THE KING-CRANE COMM’N REPORT
(1919), available at http://www.ipcri.org/files/kingcrane.html (“We recommend . . . that the
unity of Mesopotamia be preserved. . . . It should probably include at least the Vilayets of
Basra, Bagdad, and Mosul. And the Southern Kurds and Assyrians might well be linked up
with Mesopotamia. The wisdom of a united country needs no argument in the case of Mesopotamia.”).
29
HUNT, supra note 25, at 62.
30
Id.
31
Peter W. Galbraith, What Went Wrong, in THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ, supra
note 18, at 235–36.
32
Id. at 236.
33
See Human Rights Watch, supra note 9.
34
Anfal Case, supra note 15, at 38 (convicting Ali Hassan al-Majid, known as “Chemical
Ali” and five other military leaders of Saddam Hussein’s regime of genocide for their role in
the Anfal campaign ).
35
Michael M. Gunter, Kurdish Future in a Post-Saddam Iraq, 23 J. OF MUSLIM MINORITY
AFF. 9, 9 (2003).
28
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dad to overthrow Saddam Hussein. This decision allowed Saddam Hussein’s army to move north and suppress a rebellion of Shiites and Kurdish
rebels trying to overthrow Saddam.36 Fearing for their lives, as Iraqi forces
advanced into Northern Iraq, hundreds of thousands of people fled to the
Turkish and Iranian borders. The Turks refused to let the Kurds into Turkey,
but allowed reporters to televise pictures of people “dying in a sea of human
agony.”37 These pictures prompted the Bush administration to re-intervene
in Iraq.38 The United States protected the region by implementing a no-fly
zone and creating a “safe haven” that effectively gave the Iraqi Kurds de
facto control of the territory.39
In May 1992, the Kurds held the first genuinely democratic election
in the history of Iraq. This parliamentary election ended in a virtual tie between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani, and
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), led by Jalal Talabanni. After the
election, the two main parties decided not to have a run-off election but to
share power in a Council of Ministers. In the mid-1990s, this power sharing
arrangement collapsed and an intra-Kurdish civil war ensued. The war was
ended in September 1998 with help from American mediation.40
After the civil war, the Kurdistan region was divided into two administrations, both claiming to be the Kurdistan Regional Government. At
the time the Iraqi Constitution was passed, it was not clear which government was meant by the Kurdish regional government—as referred to in the
Constitution—because there were effectively two governments. Since the
Iraqi Constitution was approved by the Iraqis, the KDP and the PUK signed
the Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement (Unification
Agreement), which outlined how the two parties would share power in one
government, on January 21, 2006.41 The agreement calls for rotating the
position of Prime Minister between the KDP and the PUK. Initially, the
KDP will control the post of Prime Minister and the PUK will control the
newly created position of Vice President of the Region. The PUK also will
initially have the position of Speaker of the Kurdistan National Assembly.
Despite all of this turmoil, the two administrations have started to
function like the government of a sovereign state. United Nations Resolution 986, which ensured that thirteen percent of Iraq’s oil revenues would be
36

Peter W. Galbraith, Kurdistan in Federal Iraq, in THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ,
supra note 18, at 268.
37
Id. at 269.
38
Id.
39
Gunter, supra note 35.
40
Peter W. Galbraith, Kurdistan in Federal Iraq, supra note 18, at 269.
41
Kurdistan Regional Government Unification Agreement, Jan. 21, 2006,
http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=04030000&rnr=107&anr=8891 (last
visited Mar. 1, 2008).
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spent on projects in the Kurdistan region, greatly helped the Kurds.42 Moreover, with the revenue from the Oil-for-Food program, Kurdistan stabilized
and began to grow its economy.43 Although Northern Iraq has functioned as
a de facto independent state since 1991, no country recognizes this state.44
During the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurdistan region’s army, fought alongside the Americans in the campaign to oust Saddam Hussein from power.45 With the fall of Saddam after the U.S. invasion,
the Kurdish region gained even more autonomy and was completely freed
from the control of an oppressive dictator.
Compared to the rest of the Iraqis, the Iraqi Kurds enjoy the country’s highest living standard, highest level of foreign investment, and the
highest level of security.46 They are engaging in foreign relations with other
countries and even hosting travelers and tourists from Europe.47 Although
they are pleased with being liberated from Saddam and having more control
over their region, the Iraqi Kurds have not yet achieved their ultimate dream
of obtaining a fully independent sovereign state.
II. THE IRAQI KURDS POSSESS THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
The principle of self-determination is that distinct groups of people
have the legal right to determine for themselves to which state they wish to
belong. The idea was first articulated by President Woodrow Wilson at the
beginning of the twentieth century.48 President Wilson analogized selfdetermination to the American ideal of democracy and promoted it as the
“foreign extension of American norms of political fairness.”49 Selfdetermination now is firmly grounded in international law and both the U.N.

42

KENNETH KATZMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IRAQ: OIL-FOR-FOOD
PROGRAM, INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS, AND ILLICIT TRADE 2–4 (2003).
43
See Gunter, supra note 35, at 9.
44
Gunter, supra note 35, at 9.
45
Rubin, supra note 4, at 2.
46
Id. at 1.
47
Id.
48
Woodrow Wilson, Reply of President Woodrow Wilson to the Addresses of the Imperial German Chancellor, and the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs (Feb. 11, 1918), reprinted in OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF WAR AIMS AND PEACE
PROPOSALS, DECEMBER 1916 TO NOVEMBER 1918, at 265, 268 (James B. Scott ed. 1921)
(“‘Self-determination’ is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which
statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.”).
49
Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE
J. INT’L L. 177, 180 (1991).
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Charter50 and resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly incorporate the
principle.51
In order for a group of people to attain the right to determine their
political destiny—i.e., to choose which state they belong to—the group
must be sufficiently “distinct.” The criteria for establishing what groups of
people are sufficiently “distinct” can be split into objective elements and
subjective elements. Objective elements include “common racial background, ethnicity, language, religion, history and cultural heritage.”52 To
satisfy the subjective element, the group has to perceive itself collectively as
a distinct “people.”53
The right to self-determination can include the right to secession in
certain cases. Generally, under international law, no country or group of
people has the right to violate the territorial integrity of a country. However,
self-determination trumps territorial integrity when a country has: (1) violated the “economic, social, and cultural development” of a people, as required by U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2625;54 and (2) the people
have a valid territorial claim to the area that they wish to claim.55 In the case
of genocide, territorial integrity yields to self-determination.56 In addition,

50
The U.N. Charter provides the foundation of self-determination. See U.N. Charter art. 1,
para. 2 (declaring the purpose of the United Nations is “[t]o develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination”); Id. art. 55
(concerning the promotion of international and social cooperation based on selfdetermination); Id. art. 56 (pledging all members will enforce article 55); Id. art. 73 (using
the terms “self-government . . . political aspirations . . . [and] progressive development of . . .
free political institutions” even though self-determination is not explicitly mentioned).
51
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No 28, at 123, U.N. Doc.
A/8028 (Oct. 24, 1970) (noting that when a country does not conduct itself in compliance
with “the principle of equal rights and self-determination . . . all peoples have the right to
freely determine . . . their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural
development”).
52
PUBLIC INT’L LAW AND POLICY GROUP & NEW ENGLAND CENTER FOR INT’L LAW AND
POLICY, THE NAGORNO-KARABAGH CRISIS: A BLUEPRINT FOR RESOLUTION 18 (2000), at 18,
available at http://www.nesl.edu/center/pubs/nagorno.pdf [hereinafter NAGORNO-KARABAGH
CRISIS REPORT].
53
Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 257, 276 (1981).
54
THE NAGORNO-KARABAGH CRISIS REPORT, supra note 52, at 22.
55
Gregory J. Ewald, The Kurds Right to Secede Under International Law: SelfDetermination Prevails Over Political Manipulation, 22 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 375,
397–98 (1994).
56
See Eisuke Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response
to Territorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INT’L L. 779, 841 (1976) (noting “[t]he denial of fundamental human rights for the sake of preserving the territorial integrity of a body politic is
incompatible with the newly emerging principle of jus cogens.”); UMOZURIKE O.
UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187 (1972) (noting that “[i]f the
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de facto independence is a special factor that strengthens the right to selfdetermination over maintaining the territorial integrity of a state.57 When a
group—such as the Kurds—is the victim of genocide, has a valid territorial
claim, and has achieved de facto statehood, the case for self-determination
trumping territorial integrity is quite compelling.
A.

The Kurds Satisfy the Objective Elements of Self-Determination

Based on their common language, religion, ethnicity, history, and
culture, the Kurds satisfy the objective elements required to possess the
legal right of self-determination. The Kurds share the common language of
Kurdish. Although Kurdish is commonly referred to as a language, there are
four distinctive dialects.58 The dialects are similar enough that they are
commonly referred to as simply “Kurdish.” Schools and universities teach
Kurdish and both broadcast and print media use Kurdish as well.59 In the
Kurdish region, Arabic hardly is used at all. In fact, few Kurds under twenty-five even understand Arabic.60 Moreover, schools are starting to teach
English as much as Arabic as a second language.61
The Iraqi Kurds share a common religion. Almost all of the Kurds
are Sunni Muslim. More importantly, the Kurds share a similar outlook on
the role religion should play in society. The Kurds believe that the Iraqi
Kurdistan should remain secular.62 In the Kurdish region, all religious
groups and sects are allowed to freely follow their religious practices.63
Finally, the Iraqi Kurds are a distinct ethnicity with a common history. They are a distinct ethnicity that “dates back to 2000 BC when the first
principle of territorial intergrity (sic) is clearly incompatible with that of self-determination,
the former must, under present international law, give way to the latter.”).
57
See Committee of Jurists, Report on the Aland Islands Question, League of Nations O.J.
Spec. Supp. 3, at 6 (1920) (“From the point of view of both domestic and international law,
the formation, transformation and dismemberment of States as a result of revolutions and
wars create situations which, to a large extent, cannot be met by the application of the normal rules of positive law. . . . This transition from a de facto situation to a normal situation de
jure cannot be considered as one confined entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of a State.
It tends to lead to readjustments between the members of the international community and to
alterations in their territorial and legal status.”).
58
Alexander Dawoody, The Kurdish Quest for Autonomy and Iraq’s Statehood, 41 J.
ASIAN & AFRICAN STUDIES 483, 484 (2006).
59
Ofra Bengio, Autonomy in Kurdistan in Historical Perspective, in THE FUTURE OF
KURDISTAN IN IRAQ, supra note 18, at 176.
60
Does Independence Beckon?, supra note 1.
61
Id.
62
Peter W. Galbraith, What Went Wrong, in THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ, supra
note 18, at 244.
63
Molly McNulty, Not to be Forgotten: Children’s Rights in the Permanent Constitution,
in THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ, supra note 18, at 143, 156.
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vanguard of Indo-European-speaking people arrived and settled” in the area
known as “Kurdistan.”64 There they established their first state, the Medean
Empire in 600 BC,65 which “disintegrated into smaller kingdoms and citystates that gradually fell under the domination of the Roman or Parthian
Empires.”66 After the Medean Empire, “[n]o significant Kurdish state
emerged until 1171, when the Kurdish tribe of the Ayyubids became a dominant political player in Islam.”67 The Ayyubids Dynasty collapsed in
1249.68 After the collapse of the Ayyubids Dynasty, “[i]n 1750, a fairly
large Kurdish kingdom of the Zand was born and continued for 117 years.
In 1867, however, it collapsed at the hands of the Ottoman Turks. No other
Kurdish entity was established until 1945.”69 In 1945, “the former Soviet
Union assisted in the creation of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in western Iran.”70 In less than a year, however, this republic collapsed after the
Soviets withdrew.71 The Kurds’ struggle for statehood and autonomy over
the last few thousands of years demonstrates that, despite turmoil and
upheaval in the region, the Kurds are bonded more by their heritage and
common history than by any territorial line.
B.

The Kurds Satisfy the Subjective Element of Self-Determination

The Kurds also satisfy the subjective element of self-determination
because they perceive themselves collectively as Kurds. Although the Iraqi
Kurds have been part of Iraq for eighty years, the Kurds do not identify
themselves as Iraqi and prefer not to be part of Iraq. In January 2004, in the
span of just one month, two-thirds of Kurdistan’s adults signed a petition
demanding a vote on whether Kurdistan should remain part of Iraq.72 Immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Kurds submitted a proposed
Constitution to the Iraqi Governing Council that would make Kirkuk the
Kurdish capital and give the Kurds the constitutional right to secede from

64

Dawoody, supra note 58, at 484.
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Peter W. Galbraith, Kurdistan in Federal Iraq, in THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ,
supra note 18, at 243.
65
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Iraq at any time.73 Although the Sunnis and Shiites rejected this proposal, it
demonstrated the Kurdish desire for autonomy.74
The common identity of the Kurds has been particularly evident
since the first Gulf War. Since the war, the Kurds have enjoyed the longest
period of self-rule in a century, allowing them to freely express their culture
and identity in substantive and symbolic forms.75 National symbols have
been displayed throughout the country. Perhaps the most important national
symbol is a common flag. Kurdish flags fly throughout Kurdish region.
More strikingly, the Iraqi flag is rarely displayed.76 In addition to the flag,
the Kurds have developed a Kurdish hymn and have erected statutes and
portraits of Kurdish heroes, such as Mustafa Barzani and Mahmud
Barznji.77 Although flags, statutes, and hymns may be only symbols, they
are significant because they are tangible indications of a Kurdish sense of
common identity. Given that the Kurds see themselves collectively as Kurds
and have been fighting for self-rule, there is little doubt that they satisfy the
subjective element of self-determination.
C.

The Kurds Have a Right to Self-Determination that Includes a Right
to Independence

The right to self-determination in the case of the Kurds outweighs
the desire to maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s
regime clearly violated the economic, social, and cultural rights of the
Kurds through the genocide of the Anfal campaign. The strongest rationale
for declaring self-determination claims superior to territorial integrity
claims is very simple: democratic self-government is more righteous than
the feudal, undemocratic, and oppressive values associated with preserving
territorial boundaries.78 There is no stronger case for applying this rationale
than in the case of genocide.
The Kurds have the valid territorial claim necessary to have a right
to self-determination that includes the right of secession. Since the Kurds
have occupied the same territorial region for thousands of years—managing
to stay on their homeland and retain their distinct culture despite both efforts by other countries to take over their land, assimilate them, and general
regional upheaval—they possess a legitimate claim to the territory.79 Since
73
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the Treaty of Lausanne failed to include an independent Kurdish nation, the
Kurds subsequently fought the British in Iraq and the Iraqis to obtain an
independent or autonomous homeland. Based on this history, the Kurds
have a legitimate claim to the territory.
D.

Kurdish Territory in Northern Iraq Satisfies the Criteria
for Statehood

The qualification of a “state” under international law is defined by
the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States.80 The
Montevideo Convention requires states to possess all four of the following
requirements: “(1) a permanent population; (2) a defined territory; (3) government; and (4) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”81 The
Kurds satisfy all four requirements of the Montevideo Convention.
First, the Kurdistan region satisfies the permanent population element because the Iraqi Kurds are clearly a permanent population of about
four million people.82 This is more than enough people to qualify as a state
since countries with populations of less than 300,000 people are recognized
by the United Nations.83
Second, the Kurdistan region meets the defined territory element
because even the Iraqi Constitution recognizes the region as a territory.84
The fact that the boundaries of the Kurdistan region have not been definitively settled does not disqualify Kurdistan from being considered a state
since an entity may satisfy the territorial requirement for statehood even if
80
See Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. The Montevideo Convention is the most
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Montevideo Convention and its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 414 (1999);
M. Kelly Malone, Comment, The Rights of Newly Emerging Democratic States Prior to
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83 (1992); J.D. van der Vyver, Statehood in International Law, 5 EMORY INT'L. L. REV. 9, 14
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its boundaries are not settled or some of its territory is claimed by another
state.85
Third, the Kurdistan region satisfies the government element because it has a government. Although a state is not required to have any particular form of government, there must be some authority exercising governmental functions.86 Under Iraq’s Constitution, the central government is
Baghdad has almost no control. The Constitution recognizes the Kurdish
region and gives the KRG substantial control of it.87 The KRG has the right
to cancel federal laws, determine the tax rates of people living in the Kurdish region, and control the oil and water in the region.88 In addition, the
KRG is responsible for security in the Kurdish region and oversees the
peshmerga fighters, which include about 75,000 Kurdish troops.89 The
peshmerga are armed troops charged with the vital mission of ensuring that
the insurgency in Arab-Iraq does not enter the north.90 The KRG is a parliamentary system of government similarly structured to European democracies such as the government in the United Kingdom. The Kurdistan National Assembly is the KRG’s democratically elected parliament and has
been elected five times since 1992.91
Finally, the Kurds will undoubtedly be able to enter into relations
with other states. In many respects, it appears as if the Kurdish Regional
Government already is conducting its own foreign policy. The Kurdish Regional Government has established a Department of Foreign Relations and
has appointed a Head of the Department.92 The KRG receives members of
foreign governments and conducts both foreign policy and public relations
independent of Baghdad. Members the U.S. Congress have visited Northern
Iraq and have been hosted by the Kurdistan Regional Government.93 The
85
Restatement, supra note 80, § 201 cmt. b (“An entity may satisfy the territorial requirement for statehood even if its boundaries have not been finally settled, if one or more of its
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Kurdistan Regional Government also has met with the U.S. Secretary of
State and with the U.K. Foreign Secretary.94 After each of these meetings
there was a press conference with the U.S. or U.K. leader and KRG President Masoud Barzani.95 Both press conferences looked exactly like those
held in other recognized countries that these foreign secretaries have visited.
There were two podiums with flags on each side; noticeably absent from
both press conferences was an Iraqi flag behind President Barzani. Instead,
there was a Kurdish flag. The imagery of the press conferences projected a
powerful message to the international community: the Kurdistan region was
something far greater than a mere province of Iraq. It was much more substantial. The KRG was essentially conducting its own foreign policy. Normally, conducting foreign policy is something reserved for sovereign states,
not provinces of countries.
III. THE IRAQI KURDS CAN PEACEFULLY SECEDE THROUGH THE PROCESS
OF “EARNED SOVEREIGNTY”
Fulfilling the criteria for self-determination and the criteria for
statehood does not automatically lead to the formation of a new state. In
order to form a new, independent state, the Kurds must secede from Iraq. A
poorly-planned secession could jeopardize their chances of international
recognition, which depends largely on political persuasion. In order to maximize their chances of achieving international recognition, the Kurds must
pay close attention to the concerns of the major international powers.
Although the Kurds may be entitled to the right of selfdetermination under international law, an immediate secession from Iraq is
not the best way to ensure stability in the region and realistically gain
enough support in the international community to merit recognition. The
most viable political option, based on its likelihood of long-term success
and minimization of short-term violence, is the “earned sovereignty” approach.
Davis, Congressman Lincoln Davis Returns from Official CODEL to Iraq, Afghanistan,
Kuwait
(Jan.
16,
2008),
available
at
http://www.house.gov/lincolndavis/
news/releases/2008/080116.htm (reporting Lincoln Davis, Marsha Blackburn, Tim Walberg,
John Barrow, Brad Miller, and Nikki Tsongas also visited with the Kurdistan Regional Government).
94
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Barzani Discuss Closer Ties (Dec. 18, 2007), available at http://www.krg.
org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&anr=22021; Press Release,
U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks with Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdish Regional
Government After Their Meeting (Oct. 6, 2006), available at, http://www.
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An Overview of the “Earned Sovereignty” Approach

A gradual transition to an independent state would alleviate concerns about sudden upheaval in Iraq and could be accomplished through
implementing an “earned sovereignty” approach to self-determination.
Earned sovereignty “entails the conditional and progressive devolution of
sovereign powers and authority from a state to a substate entity under international supervision.”96 In short, earned sovereignty is a gradual transition
of power with international approval. With such an approach, the Iraqi
Kurds could gradually transition from Iraqi authority to having their own
independent sovereign state. The successful implementation of the earned
sovereignty approach in conflicts around the world demonstrates its potential for success in the Kurdish region of Iraq.
Traditional approaches to resolving sovereignty-based conflicts can
be characterized as either “sovereignty first” approaches or “selfdetermination first” approaches.97 The “sovereignty first” approach is based
primarily upon the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence.98 The “self-determination first” approach is based upon
the legal principles relating to self-determination and the protection of human rights.99 In general, state wishing to preserve their territorial integrity
rely on the “sovereignty first” approach, and secessionist movements rely
on the “self-determination first” approach.
History has shown that these two approaches have failed to provide
acceptable options for structuring peaceful resolutions to conflicts based on
claims of sovereignty. The main problem with strictly adopting the “sovereignty first” approach is that it can justify the actions of regimes that pursue aggressive action against their own people under the auspices of maintaining territorial integrity and sovereignty.100 Moreover, “the mantra of
sovereignty has been used by states to shield themselves from international
action resulting from human rights abuses committed as part of their attempts to stifle self-determination movements.”101 One has to look no further than the Anfal campaigns against the Kurds in Iraq to realize how aggressive regimes can use their power under the guise of sovereignty to repress minorities.
The “self-determination first” approach has flaws as well. “Selfdetermination” rhetoric has been abused in the past and is often used by
96
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rebels to justify violence. In Iraq, the mantra of self-determination has been
used by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a terrorist group, to justify
violent tactics in the name of achieving independence.102 The risk of endorsing a “self-determination first” approach and immediately calling for Kurdish succession is that this would simply supply the PKK and other separatist groups in the Kurdish region with international justification and support
for a potential campaign of violence. Moreover, any violence or terrorism
by the PKK could be used by Turkey as justification for continuing air campaigns and bombings in Northern Iraq, which are obviously destabilizing to
the region.103
The “earned sovereignty” approach seeks to address the inherent
flaws with the “sovereignty first” approach and the “self-determination
first” approach. In Northern Iraq, the primary advantage of following an
“earned sovereignty” approach is that it will prevent the Arab majority in
Iraq and Turkey from using a guise of “territorial integrity” and state sovereignty to justify committing horrific acts against the Kurds, similar to those
done in the past. To the extent possible, an “earned sovereignty” approach
also will limit the backlash from other states in the region—like Turkey—
that may use “territorial integrity” arguments to maintain current boundaries
of Iraq at the peril of the Kurds’ human rights. Finally, an “earned sovereignty” approach also may address some of the inherent problems with
strict application of the “self-determination first” approach. An “earned
sovereignty” approach could reduce the violence caused by separatist rebels
in the PKK wishing to use any means necessary to form an independent
state.
B.

The Elements of “Earned Sovereignty”

There are three main elements of earned sovereignty. The first element is shared sovereignty. At this stage, “the state and substate entity may
both exercise some sovereign authority . . . over a defined territory.”104 The
second element is institution building. During this stage, the substate works
with the international community to develop the political infrastructure and
government institutions needed to handle the increased authority involved in
successfully administering a sovereign country.105 The third element is the
determination of the final status of the substate entity and its relationship to
the parent state. This stage can be resolved through referendum or a negotiated settlement between the state and the substate entity.106 Ultimately, the
102
103
104
105
106
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determination of final status for the substate entity depends on the consent
of the international community in the form of international recognition.107
C.

Successful Implementation of “Earned Sovereignty” Around the
World

The earned sovereignty approach has been implemented successfully around the world. Montenegro, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland are all examples of successful implementation of the earned sovereignty approach. In
all three cases, varying degrees of the earned sovereignty approach was
used to end ethnic struggles.
1.

Montenegro

Like the Kurds, the Montenegrins have a history of independence in
spite of regional upheaval.108 After the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation in 1989, Serbia and Montenegro joined in passing the Constitution of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.109 According to the U.S. State Department, although Montenegro reaffirmed its attachment to Serbia by signing
the Constitution, a distinct sense of Montenegrin identity persisted.110 Most
notably, “[t]he government of Montenegro was critical of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s 1998-99 campaign in Kosovo, and . . . boycotted
the September 2000 federal elections, which led to the eventual [fall] of
Milosevic’s regime.”111
The European Union (EU) brokered a treaty between Serbia and
Montenegro that allowed for the sharing and gradual devolution of all sovereign authority between Serbia and Montenegro.112 The Union Treaty between Serbia and Montenegro called for three years of shared sovereignty
followed by a referendum to give final approval of the dissolution of the
union with Serbia.113 On May 21, 2006, the people of Montenegro passed a
referendum and Montenegro declared independence from the political entity
107
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of Serbia and Montenegro on June 3, 2006.114 Serbia, the European Union,
and all permanent members of the United Nations Security Counsel, including the United States, recognize the Republic of Montenegro’s independence.115
With ethnic struggles and political upheaval largely behind it, Montenegro is poised for peace and economic prosperity. Perhaps the biggest
political achievement in Montenegro is the progress of EU accession negotiations. These negotiations picked up speed after Montenegro declared its
independence.116 In October 2007, Montenegro and the EU signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement, which opened up trade between Montenegro and the EU market.117 The political progress in Montenegro has led
to economic progress. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in 2007 reached
$1.379 billion, which is ten times higher than in 2004.118 Although $1.379
billion may not seem that high, with a population of only 630,000, investment per capita is $2,223, which is one of the highest rates in Europe.119
2.

Kosovo

Prior to February 17, 2008, when Kosovo’s parliament declared
Kosovo’s independence from Serbia, Kosovo was a region in Serbia. In
1998, Serbia was in turmoil when the Kosovar Albanians sought independence from Serbia. The United States and NATO intervened by sending
planes to bomb the Serbs in order to prevent them from “ethnically cleansing” the Albanians.120 After the bombing campaign, on June 9, 1999,
NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—now the countries of Serbia and Montenegro—“signed an agreement for the withdrawal of Yugoslav
forces from Kosovo.”121 On June 10, 1999, the Security Council passed
Resolution 1244, creating the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Resolution 1244 “provide[s] an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial
autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and . . . provide[s]
114
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transitional administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions.”122
The UNMIK “assumed responsibility for nearly all of Kosovo’s sovereign authority.”123 Over time, the UNMIK created a Kosovo Constitutional Framework that provided for a parliament, a president, and a mechanism for gradually transferring power to Kosovo’s governing institutions.124
Since UNMIK transferred power to Kosovo’s governing institutions, Kosovo has held elections and the two major Albanian parties have struck a power sharing deal.125 Both parties in Kosovo agreed that the first priority in
Kosovo was to declare independence and worked with the United States and
the European Union to calm fears about instability in the region before declaring independence.126
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo’s parliament declared Kosovo’s independence from Serbia.127 Following Kosovo’s declaration, the U.S. and
several European states officially recognized the independence of Kosovo.128 However, Serbia and Russia refused to recognize Kosovo’s independence.129
Although some suggest that Kosovo may fall into civil war again,
the amount of political progress in Kosovo has been tremendous. Ten years
ago, thousands of ethnic Albanians that were living in Kosovo were forced
to flee their homes out of fear for their lives.130 NATO officials estimated
that 118,000 ethnic Albanians had been forced out of Kosovo since Serbian
tanks moved into Kosovo.131 The city of Pec, which had a population of
about 100,000 ethnic Albanians before the Serbs moved in, was almost totally destroyed.132 For the first time in history, Kosovo has its own sovereign state and will no longer be subject to the oppression of the Serbs.
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Northern Ireland

Since the Irish declared independence in 1916, there has been bitter
conflict in Northern Ireland between Protestants who wished to remain part
of the United Kingdom and Catholics who wanted to join the Republic of
Ireland.133 In the thirty years of violence known as “the Troubles,” more
than 3,700 people died in sectarian fighting and conflict with the British
Army in Northern Ireland.134 The Good Friday Agreement halted more than
a century of turmoil in Northern Ireland and it governs the political relationship among Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, and Great Britain.135
The Good Friday Agreement provides for the creation of institutions in Northern Ireland and the gradual devolution of substantial power to
the newly created institutions.136 In addition, the Good Friday Agreement
specifies that the people of Northern Ireland have the right to decide for
themselves the issue of unification with Ireland through a referendum.137
Progress on all of the major elements to the Good Friday Agreement has
been made.138 In particular, the security situation in Northern Ireland has
reached a safe level. The IRA disarmed and is no longer considered a terrorist threat.139
After over a century of conflict and more than twenty years of
failed attempts to reach a peaceful arrangement, the Good Friday Agreement is the first real chance for a long-term peaceful solution. With the
prospect of lasting peace ahead of it, Northern Ireland’s economy has improved. This is evident in both the employment market and in real estate.140
Although Northern Ireland has even greater potential for economic growth,
lasting peace will allow for significant long-term advances.
D.

Adopting an Earned Sovereignty Approach in Northern Iraq

The relative peace and prosperity in Montenegro, Kosovo, and
Northern Ireland illustrate that “earned sovereignty” effectively can be used
133
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to end sovereignty-based conflict in countries that have been plagued by
war and violence. All three examples are relevant to the case of the Kurds in
Northern Iraq because of the similarities between the conflicts. Like Northern Iraq, the Balkans and Northern Ireland have had a long history of violence and ethnic struggle. Montenegro and Kosovo were both formed after
the breakup of the former Yugoslavia.141 Like Yugoslavia, Iraq’s boundaries
were created by foreign states.142 In addition, like Yugoslavia, Iraq is a conglomerate of distinct ethnic groups grouped under an umbrella state. The
conflict in Northern Ireland also shares relevant similarities with Northern
Iraq. Like Northern Iraq, Northern Ireland had a long-lasting conflict between two countries with distinct religious traditions. Given the success of
the “earned sovereignty” approach in these countries, it is appropriate to
follow a similar approach in the Kurdish region of Iraq.
Adopting an earned sovereignty approach in Northern Iraq could
potentially insure lasting peace and prosperity. The first two phases of implementing an “earned sovereignty” approach to conflict resolution are
“shared sovereignty” and institution building.143 The relationship between
the semi-autonomous Kurdish region and Iraq already can be properly described as shared sovereignty. Shared sovereignty is characterized by a period where the substate entity is given substantial elements of selfgovernment.144 Since the first Gulf War, Iraqi Kurdistan has been autonomous and the Iraqi Kurds have been forced to govern themselves. In all of
Iraq, the Kurdish region has the most experience with the democratic
process. The Kurds have their own Parliament—elected five times since
1992.145 The power of the Kurdish people to govern themselves is not only
evident in the Kurdish Parliament, but also in the executive arm of the Kurdish Regional Government, which oversees all of the ministries and departments of the government.
Compared to Montenegro, Kosovo, and Northern Ireland, the Kurdish region is more advanced at the inception of its pursuit of statehood in
terms of the institutions that are necessary to have a fully-functioning democratic government. The Kurdish region already administers local government services.146 In addition, the region has already begun building legislative institutions needed in a democratic government, including a democrati-
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cally elected Parliament that passes legislation. Lastly, the foreign policy
institutions and leadership have already begun to conduct foreign policy.147
In states with a history of violence and conflict, security is a major
concern. Northern Ireland historically has been plagued by extreme
groups—such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) that use terrorism as a
way of promoting its goals. The peace process in Northern Ireland illustrates that a gradual approach to sovereignty can successfully facilitate the
disarming of extreme terrorist groups such as the IRA.148 Like in Northern
Ireland, the Kurdish region has its own extreme group, the PKK.149 If it was
possible to disarm the IRA in Northern Ireland through a gradual transition
of sovereignty, it seems quite plausible that the same thing can be done in
Northern Iraq to eventually disarm extreme groups like the PKK. On the
security front, some progress has been made in the Kurdish region, but there
is a long way to go.150 In Northern Ireland, the U.K. still maintains security
in Northern Ireland. In contrast, the Kurdish region is already ahead of
Northern Ireland with respect to implementing its own security force.151 The
security force is controlled by the Kurds. Baghdad police, or even foreign
forces, are barely present in the region.152
Settling border disputes is the Kurds’ primary challenge. The main
dispute regarding the boundaries of the Kurdistan region is determining the
fate of the city of Kirkuk and the surrounding region. The Kirkuk region is
immediately adjacent to the official Kurdistan region and is populated predominately with Kurds.153 Although the Kirkuk region was historically part
of the territory of the Kurds, the Kurdistan region reflects the borders drawn
by Saddam Hussein and does not include the Kirkuk region. Saddam Hussein did not want to include Kirkuk in the Kurdistan region because Kirkuk
is rich with oil.154 The Kurds would like this area to be officially recognized
as part of the Kurdistan region since it was historically a part of their territory, contains a Kurdish majority, and has been administered as if part of the
Kurdistan Regional Government territory since 1992. The current Iraqi
147
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Constitution calls for the people living in the Kirkuk region to determine for
themselves whether they would like to be part of the Kurdistan region.155
Even though settling border disputes will prove challenging, it is something
that must be done regardless of whether or not the Kurdistan region becomes an independent state.
Lastly, the most important work left to be done is establishing protections for the minorities in the Kurdistan region. This can be done by
building up the Justice Ministry of the KRG and making sure that the legal
system is effective. The Kurdish Regional Government has taken the initial
step of recognizing the importance of protecting human rights by creating a
Ministry for Human Rights and appointing a Minister to lead the department.156 Failure to convince the international community of its ability to
protect the rights of minorities would be a fatal blow to international recognition.
E.

Recognition of a Kurdish State is Dependent on Politics and
Diplomacy

The legality of a potential Kurdish secession would ultimately be
judged by whether or not the international community recognizes Kurdistan
as a state. Although recognition is not an element of statehood, failure to be
recognized would greatly impair Kurdistan’s political and economic relations with other countries.157 For example, the territory of Northern Cyprus,
which is not recognized by any country other than Turkey, suffers harm to
this day because of its illegal secession.158 The EU does not have diplomatic
155
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relations with Northern Cyprus and refuses to trade with them. Moreover,
the EU has punished Turkey for recognizing Northern Cyprus by using it as
a reason to stall Turkey’s EU accession negotiations.159 In sum, although
international recognition is not a requirement for statehood, it is a highly
desirable goal for the Iraqi Kurds.
Kurdistan’s chances of gaining international recognition will greatly
increase if it works with the international community to gradually “earn”
sovereignty. Montenegro, Northern Ireland, and Kosovo demonstrate that
working with the international community is a powerful way to build up the
political capital necessary to gain recognition from other states in the international community.160 More specifically, Kosovo demonstrates that major
international powers will recognize a newly formed state regardless of
whether the former parent state recognizes the new country. With Kosovo,
western countries recognized Kosovo even though Serbia, the parent state,
strongly opposed recognition.161 This is an important precedent for a Kurdish state because it shows that the United States and other powerful countries could realistically recognize Kurdistan even if Iraq objects.
IV. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SUPPORT KURDISH STATEHOOD
Given that the United States is a highly influential country and has
invested tremendous resources in the Iraq war, gaining its support is especially important if the Iraqi Kurds hope to secure recognition from other
states. Therefore, it is necessary explore the interests of the United States
regarding Kurdish statehood. Ultimately, Kurdish statehood is in the best
interest of the United States and the United States should fully support Kurdish statehood.
A.

Kurdish State Would Allow the U.S. to Exit Iraq on a Positive Note

With the exception of the Kurdish region, Iraq has been in great
turmoil since the U.S. invasion in 2003. Sectarian violence has been a huge
problem162 and the Iraqi central government has not been able to meet most
of the political benchmarks set by the United States.163 However, in the
Kurdish territory of Iraq, the U.S. invasion and occupation has been largely
recognize the purported state set up by the secessionist actors, nor to facilitate—or in any
way assist—the secessionist entity. S.C. Res. 550, ¶3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/550 (May 11, 1984).
Turkey is the only state in the world that has accorded recognition to the illegal “Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus.” Jacovides, supra, at 1228.
159
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beneficial. The Kurds are enjoying more autonomy than ever before and
have not been plagued by the sectarian violence found in the rest of the
country.164 Assisting the Kurds achieve statehood would allow the United
States to exit Iraq on a positive note.
An independent Kurdish state would be a secular, self-supporting
democracy, consistent with the values of the United States. Former President George W. Bush consistently has maintained that spreading democracy
in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East is a major justification for the Iraq
war and the United States’ ongoing presence in Iraq.165 Although spreading
democracy is a commendable goal, it is unlikely that democracy can thrive
in areas with high rates of sectarian violence. Supporting the independence
of the Kurdish territory would allow democracy to take hold in a more stable region. Moreover, the Kurdish region has more experience with democracy than any other part of Iraq. There have been five parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan region since 1992.166 If the United States is truly
committed to spreading democracy in the Middle East, supporting Kurdish
statehood is its best opportunity to see democracy thrive there.
The secular democracy found in the Kurdish region reflects American values. Secularism and freedom of religious expression are American
values firmly embedded in the U.S. Constitution.167 These values are shared
by the Iraqi Kurds.168 In contrast, Iraqi Shiites believe that Islam must be the
basis for Iraqi law.169 This belief has caused Iraq to “express[] reservations
on the issue of freedom of religion.”170 Deeply rooted divisions about the
proper role of religion in government will paralyze the effectiveness of any
centralized government responsible for all of Iraq. An independent Kurdish
state will not be burdened with fights over the role of religion in government.
Lastly, an independent Kurdish state would not be a financial burden on the international community. The large oil reserves in the Kurdistan
region could support the country economically.171 The United States has
committed itself to helping Kosovo function as an independent state through
tremendous financial aid.172 In contrast, a Kurdish state could prosper inde164

See supra notes 7 and 77–80 and accompanying text.
See Tyler Marshall, Bush's Foreign Policy Shifting, L.A. TIMES, Jun. 5, 2005, at A1.
166
Does Independence Beckon?, supra note 1.
167
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
168
See McNulty, supra note 63, at 156.
169
Galbraith, supra note 33, at 244.
170
McNulty, supra note 63, at 156.
171
Does Independence Beckon?, supra note 1.
172
Kulish & Chivers, supra note 128, at A10 (explaining that the U.S. gave $77 million in
aid to Kosovo in 2007 and would raise that amount to roughly $335 million in 2008).
165

2009]

KURDISH STATEHOOD IN IRAQ

539

pendently and would not burden the United States or the international community.
B.

Newly Formed State Would Not Disrupt Region

Critics of Kurdish statehood maintain that a Kurdish state would
cause chaos in the region and ultimately lead to more destruction of human
life. This fear is based on the idea that the Kurds that live in the surrounding
countries of Turkey and Iran will either want to join the newly created Kurdistan or cause rebellion in their own countries.173 While there is always a
chance that Kurds in Turkey and Iran will rebell with the formal recognition
of a Kurdish state in Iraq, this fear seems overstated considering the fact
that Kurds living in Turkey and Iran have not caused any major disruptions
in the wake of the de facto Kuridsh state that has existed in Iraq since 2003.
Moreover, the United States and other powerful countries can take measures
to insure that the recognition of a Kurdish state does not cause regional
upheaval. For example, the United States can pressure Turkey to refrain
from moving troops into the Kurdistan region and negotiate with the Kurdish Regional Government to condition its diplomatic recognition on a
commitment to directly reign in terrorist groups, such as the PKK.174
Even if the United States fails to prevent Kurdistan’s neighbors
from intervening, that does not justify a policy of continuing to deprive the
Kurds of their own state. The level of disruption should be taken into account when weighing the benefits of allowing secession against the problems it could create.175 It is very difficult for critics of Kurdish statehood to
claim that the loss of the Kurdistan region would unduly disrupt Iraq. The
oppression that the Kurds have suffered at the hands of Saddam Hussein
and the refugee problem caused by the turmoil since the U.S. invasion have
been far greater disruptions to the country than what would result from
eventual Kurdish secession—especially considering the sucession would
really be a continuation of the de facto Kurdish state.176 Given the amount
of violance in Iraq since the U.S. invasion, it is hard to imagine that the result of gradually liberating the Kurdistan region would profoundly disrupt
the country.
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C.

Kurdish State Would be a Strong U.S. Ally in a Strategically
Significant Region

Even though the Middle East is vital to the economic interests of
the United States—with its abundance of oil—the United States lacks allies
near or among the Middle Eastern countries with large oil reserves. While
many argue that Turkey and Saudi Arabia are strong allies, both of these
countries have proven unreliable in the past. Turkey consistently has refused
to help the United States when it is needed most—during times of war. Turkey did not allow the United States to use its military bases in Southern
Turkey as a platform to attack Iraq from the north in March 2003.177 This
refusal is part of a history of non-cooperation with the United States. In
1979, Turkey refused the U.S. request to allow U-2 intelligence flights over
Turkish airspace “unless Moscow agreed,”178 and in May 1989, Turkey rejected an American request to inspect an advanced Soviet fighter plane
flown by a Soviet defector to Turkey.179 While Saudi Arabia was a key ally
in the Gulf War in 1993, its government refused to allow American planes
to carry out strikes from bases in Saudi Arabia in the 2003 Iraq war.180
Given the lack of U.S. allies in the Middle East and the region’s
importance to vital U.S. economic and security interests, an independent
Kurdistan could be an important ally given its close proximity to Iran, Syria,
and Iraq.181 The Kurds would be receptive to assisting the United States
because Kurdistan would be a newly formed state and benefit tremendously
from the security that comes along with being an ally of the United
States.182 The Kurds might even allow the United States to build a military
base in Kurdistan since the Kurds would benefit significantly from knowing
that none of its neighbors would attack a country with a U.S. military
base.183 A military base, or at least use of Kurdish bases, would benefit the
United States greatly. The U.S. could use the base to strike at al Qaeda in
adjacent Sunni territories, limit Iran’s progress on nuclear weapons, and
177
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protect Israel.184 In short, supporting Kurdish statehood would give the
United States a tremendous ally in a strategically significant part of the
world.
CONCLUSION
The case for Kurdish statehood in Iraq is quite compelling. At the
end of World War I, the Kurds missed a great opportunity for statehood
when the Allies redrew the borders in the Middle East.185 Since being left
without a state, the Kurds have suffered tremendously at the hands of others. Most notably, the Kurds were the victims of a genocide inflicted by
Saddam Hussein during the Anfal campaign.186 With the fall of Saddam
Hussein, the Iraqi Kurds have an incredible opportunity to fulfill their
dream of statehood.
Based on their common background, history, language, and culture,
the Iraqi Kurds are a distinct group of people and, therefore, possess the
legal right of self-determination.187 Not only do the Iraqi Kurds possess the
right of self-determination, but they could successfully secede from Iraq
with broad support and minimal disruption to the region. Kosovo, Northern
Ireland, and Montenegro illustrate that the process of “earned sovereignty”
can successfully end sovereignty-based struggles in countries with tremendous histories of religious and ethnic turmoil. The similarity between the
religious and ethnic conflicts in these countries and Iraq provides hope that
the same approach could be followed in the Kurdish region of Iraq.
Kurdish statehood has the potential to be the best thing to emerge
from the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The image of the U.S. has been severely
tainted in the international community since the invasion of Iraq.188 It is not
often that foreign policy provides a country an opportunity to serve its own
interest while simultaneously improving the lives of a people on the other
side of the globe. Strong U.S. support of Kurdish statehood would help restore America’s image in the international community and garner the support of a new ally in a strategically significant area. The United States
should not miss the chance to reward a people haunted by the pain and suffering of genocide and the opportunity to offer a beacon of hope to all future
generations of humankind aspiring for democratic self-rule.
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